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COMMENTS
the community property approach to determine the widow's loss,
the courts have already begun to evolve such criteria. A further
extension of the establishment of definite criteria to measure
the loss of different plaintiffs will probably result in more
awards that actually compensate for the damage sustained. :
Merwin M. Brandon, Jr.
Problems of the Retained Employee in Louisiana
Workmen's Compensation Law
INTRODUCTION
The problems created by the retention of an injured employee
are some of the most confusing in Workmen's Compensation
Law. A retained employee is one who has suffered a disability
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Statute, but
has been retained by the employer to do such work as he is
still able to perform.' Retention of the injured employee is
thought to be socially desirable since rehabilitation often results
from the continued employment. 2 However, several problems
arise when the injured employee resigns, is dismissed, or seeks
to have his compensation fixed when he is receiving wages.
These problems generally are as follows: (1) whether to allow
the employer credit for wages paid after the injury; (2) whether
an action by the employee to have his compensation fixed,
brought during the retention period, is premature; (3) whether
prescription has accrued against the claim. Since the issues of
wage credit, prematurity, and prescription are closely related,
the courts have attempted to achieve consistency within the
various rules to be applied to each individually. The result has
been confusion because it is impossible to maintain consistency
and at the same time reach a desirable solution to the retained
employees problem. For instance, it seems desirable for an em-
ployee to be able to bring suit to have his compensation claim
set even while he is receiving wages. At the same time it ap-
pears undesirable to force him to go to court by having pre-
scription run on his claim. It also seems desirable to give an
employer credit for wages paid to the employee on a subsequent





compensation suit. Yet if this is allowed, consistency precludes
the employee's being able to bring suit while the wages are being
paid.
The first decisions in the problem areas of the retained em-
ployee were in harmony. When wages were paid for lighter
work, the employer was credited for having made compensation
payments.3 The payments, since considered as compensation,
made a suit on the compensation claim premature4 and inter-
rupted prescription. 5 The real difficulty began with the case
of Carlino v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,6 where
it was held that a suit to have compensation set while being
paid regular wages for lighter work was not premature. The
natural inference from the Carlino decision would be that if a
suit is not premature when wages are being paid, then such
wages must not be considered as compensation and therefore
the payments should not interrupt the running of prescription.
This interpretation of the case was subsequently adopted. 7 At
the same time it would be logical to assume that on the basis
of the Carlino decision the employer should not be allowed credit
as having made compensation payments. Nevertheless, the
Carlino case gave the employer credit for the wages paid on the
compensation judgment.8 As a result an anomalous situation
arose. Wages were considered compensation for the purpose
of credit, but not for the purpose of determining prematurity
and prescription. The inconsistency of this rule has been mini-
mized by the latest decisions relating to retained employees
which have held that unearned wages will be considered as com-
pensation to form the basis for a plea of prematurity.9 In line
with this position it has been held that unearned wages will
interrupt prescription' and also will be credited against the
3. Hennen v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 So. 654 (La. App. 1938)
Becton v. Deas Paving Co., 3 La. App. 683 (1926).
4. See Ulmer v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 190 So. 175 (La. App.
1939).
5. Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 194 So. 99 (La. App.
1940).
6. 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
7. See Thornton v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d
46 (1944).
8. Carlino v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 196 La. 400, 199 So.
228 (1940).
9. See D'Antoni v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 213 La. 67, 34 So.2d 378
(1948).
10. Thornton v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d 46
(1944) ; Chauvin v. St. Mary Iron Works, 55 So.2d 617 (La. App. 1951);
Perkins v. American Employers Ins. Co., 53 So.2d 462 (La. App. 1951) ; Cradeur
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employer's compensation liability, at least where the employee
is rehired to do different work."
A better understanding can probably be reached by consider-
ing each of the three problems individually, and the way in
which policy on the one hand and consistency on the other has
influenced the decisions.
CREDIT TO THE EMPLOYER FOR WAGES PAID THE
RETAINED EMPLOYEE
It would seem desirable to credit the employer with wages
paid to the retained employee in order to encourage rehabilita-
tion of the employee by the employer. It is apparent that an
employer will be more likely to find work that an employee can
manage if he knows he will not be forced to ppy both wages
and compensation. However, it would be erroneous to assume
that all wages paid to an injured employee are gratuitous. In
most cases it would seem that part of the wages paid during
the retention period are earned and part of them are unearned.
Thus the question of whether to allow the employer credit for
the full wages paid or only for the unearned is presented. If the
employer is given credit for all wages paid without drawing the
distinction between those earned and unearned, the wages paid
to the retained employee will offset compensation due him. This
rule, if adopted, would be simple and easily administered. How-
ever, it might appear unfair to the employee who actually earns
part of his wages. On the other hand, it seems that the em-
ployer who gratuitously rehires a disabled employee and places
him in a position where he can earn his wages, should be given
some consideration for his effort to help the employee. Thus
from the employer's standpoint it seems fair to credit him at
least with the unearned wages paid the retained employee.
The decisions which have dealt with the problem of wage
credit for the retaining employer are in conflict in regard to
the question of earned and unearned wages. The Supreme Court
first held in Hulo v. City of New Iberia'2 that an employer would
be credited with unearned wages only. The total credit allowed
in this case was for the actual amount paid which was unearned
v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 52 So.2d 601 (La. App. 1951); Abshire v.
Cities Service Refining Corp., 50 So.2d 307 (La. App. 1951).
11. Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d 218 (1952).
12. 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923).
1960]
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and equal to the amount of compensation to which the employee
was entitled. 13 However, the courts of appeal cases decided sub-
sequently granted full credit for all wages paid, making no
mention of the Hulo case. 14 Perhaps the courts of appeal felt
that wages paid for lighter work were in fact gratuitous and in
the nature of compensation. The Supreme Court seemed to align
itself with the latter decisions when it next considered the prob-
lem in Carlino v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,15 where
it held that there was no cause of action for compensation for
those weeks wages were paid for lighter work, whether earned
or unearned. 6 The Carlino case was adhered to by the courts
of appeal even where evidence conclusively established that the
retained employee actually earned his wages. 17 However, in its
latest decision, the Supreme Court limited the Carlino case by
holding that credit would not be allowed where the employee
earned his wages at different lighter work.' s The court may
have been motivated by the above-mentioned policy that it seems
unfair to credit the employer with wages the employee actually
earned. This may be especially true where the employee is earn-
ing his wages at work different from that previously done and
where he is able to handle all aspects of the work. Thus it may
be said that the Supreme Court will make no distinction between
earned and unearned wages with respect to credit, unless the
13. In the Hulo case the court allowed the employer credit for wages paid
over the amount earned to the extent which wages so paid exceeded the amount of
compensation to which claimant was entitled. Thus, if claimant was receiving $60
per month over the amount earned, and he was entitled to $30 per month com-
pensation, the employer would get credit for two months compensation each time
the $60 was paid.
14. Hennen v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 178 So. 654 (La. App. 1938)
Becton v. Deas Paving Co., 3 La. App. 683 (1926).
15. 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
16. The Carlino case also established a new method of determining the amount
to be credited. The court held that the employer would be credited for the number
of weeks worked regardless of the amount of wages paid.
17. Arbo v. Maryland Casualty Co., 29 So.2d 380 (La. App. 1947); Daigle
v. Higgins Industries Inc., 29 So.2d 374 (La. App. 1947); Sumrall v. E. I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 1 So.2d 430 (La. App. 1941). Numerous cases fol-
lowed Carlino with respect to credit for unearned wages. Hingle v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 30 So.2d 281 (La. App. 1947) ; Rigsby v. John W. Clark Lumber
Co., 28 So.2d 346 (La. App. 1946) ; Fisher v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 28 So.2d
59 (La. App. 1946) ; Gautreau v. Maryland Casualty Co., 28 So.2d 96 (La. App.
1946) ; Annen v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 28 So.2d 46 (La. App. 1946) ;
Vega v. Higgins Industries Inc., 23 So.2d 661 (La. App. 1945); Butzman v.
Delta Shipbuilding Co., 21 So.2d 80 (La. App. 1945) ; McKenzie v. Standard
Motor Car Co., 15 So.2d 115 (La. App. 1943).
18. See Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d 218
(1952). The case has been adhered to by the court of appeal in White v. Cal-
casieu Paper Co., 96 So.2d 621 (La. App. 1957) ; Myers v. Jahneke Service, Inc.,
76 So.2d 436 (La. App. 1954).
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employee is rehired to do different lighter work. In the latter
case credit will be allowed to the employer only for unearned
wages paid to the retained employee.
PREMATURITY
Prior to its amendment in 1926 the prematurity provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act granted the employee ac-
cess to the courts any time a dispute existed between him and
his employer as to his claim.' 9 This was held to be the case even
though the employee was receiving maximum compensation at
the time suit was filed.2 0 The 1926 amendment provides that a
suit will be premature and dismissed unless the employee alleges
that his employer is not paying and has refused to pay the
"maximum percent of wages" to which the employee is entitled.2'
Hence, as amended the statute allows payment of maximum com-
pensation to bar a suit as premature even though a dispute might
exist as to other aspects of the claim.
22
Since the retained employee is receiving wage payments, an
employer would plead prematurity if the retained employee sued
to establish his right to compensation. Thus the question is
presented as to whether wages paid to a retained employee may
be considered as maximum percent of wages within the meaning
of the statute dealing with prematurity. Although an earlier
case seemed to indicate that a suit brought while an employee
was receiving wages for lighter work would be premature,
23
the Supreme Court decided in the Carlino2l case that such a suit
would not be dismissed as premature.2 5 While the court in the
Carlino case did not expressly hold that wages paid were not to
19. La. Acts 1914, No. 20, § 1, provided in part: "Be it further enacted, etc.,
that in case of a dispute over, or failure to agree upon a claim for compensation
between employer and employee, or the dependents of the employee, either party
may present a verified complaint to the Judge of the Court which would have
jurisdiction in a civil case. . . ." Section 18(4) further provided that if the above
was complied with "the Judge shall decide the merits of the controversy.'
20. Hulo v. City of New Iberia, 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923) ; Daniels v.
Shreveport Producing & Refining Corp., 151 La. 800, 92 So. 341 (1922) ; Ford v.
Fortuna Oil Co., 151 La. 489, 91 So. 849 (1922) ; Note, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
837 (1941) ; Comment, 20 TuL. L. REV. 148 (1945).
21. LA. R.S. 23:1314 (1950).
22. Moss v. Levin, 10 La. App. 149, 119 So. 558 (1929) ; Pitts v. M. W.
Kellog Co., 186 So. 389 (La. App. 1939) ; Reiner v. Maryland Casualty Co., 185
So. 93 (La. App. 1938).
23. See Ulmer v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 190 So. 175 (La. App.
1939).





be considered as maximum percent of wages this would be the
logical inference from the decision. The next decision dealing
with the question interpreted the Carlino case as being authority
for the rule that wages paid the retained employee are not to
be considered as maximum precent of wages within the meaning
of the statute.26 The court explained that the reason a suit is
premature is because of the failure of the employee to allege
that the employer has not paid him compensation, not because
the employee fails to allege that the employer has not paid him
wages. 27 Thus, only compensation would operate to bar a suit
and wages paid a retained employee would not be considered as
compensation. The Carlino case has since been restricted by the
court to instances where earned wages were paid.28 Unearned
wages are treated as compensation and thus a suit brought while
such are being received would be premature under the statute.
PRESCRIPTION OF THE CLAIM
A. Interruption
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides for a one-year
prescriptive period which will run from the time of the ac-
cident.29 It further provides that prescription will be interrupted
by compensation payments 0 The prescription problem with
reference to the retained employee is whether wages paid as
compensation payments will interrupt prescription.
Originally, the word payment in the statute was construed
literally to mean payments made as compensation according to
agreement between the parties.8 1 Hence, wages paid a retained
employee were not considered as payments within the meaning
of the statute and would not interrupt prescription unless the
parties had so agreedY2 However, the courts later adopted a
different position relative to the retained employee, treating
wages paid him as payments that would interrupt prescription.3"
This was perhaps motivated by the fear that if prescription were
26. Thornton v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d 46(1944).
27. Ibid.
28. D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 213 La. 67, 34 So.2d 378
(1948).
29. LA. R.S. 23:1209 (1950).
30. Ibid.
31. Brister v. Wray Dickinson Co., 183 La. 562, 164 So. 415 (1935).
32. Ibid.




allowed to run while wages were being paid, the employer would
rehire the employee for a year and then dismiss him.
It appears that the rule allowing wage payments to a re-
tained employee to interrupt prescription on his compensation
claim still obtains in Louisiana with some modification. The
modification was probably the result of the Carlino case, wherein
the court held that a suit by a retained employee was not pre-
mature although brought while he was receiving wages. 4 In
cases arising thereafter where prescription was the issue, the
courts seemed to feel that if wages paid the retained employee
were not compensation for prematurity purposes, then they
should not be regarded as compensation for purposes of pre-
scription.35 However, as pointed out before, the courts began to
make a distinction between earned and unearned wages in cases
involving prematurity.8 6 The same distinction arose in cases
dealing with prescription.3 7  The net result is that the term
payment in the statute still includes wages paid the retained
employee, but only if they are unearned. The rationale is that
if unearned wages are compensation so as to make a suit pre-
mature then they of necessity must be compensation so as to
interrupt prescription.
Since the court has brought the distinction between earned
and unearned wages into the prescription analysis, the recurring
problem of deciding when wages are earned must be considered
in each case. The answer, of course, will depend upon the facts
of each case. However, it has been held that wages are not un-
earned simply because an injured employee was paid for lighter
work. 8  One case went so far as to hold that there must be an
implied understanding between the interested parties before
wages paid a retained employee could be considered payments
34. 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
35. See Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 15 So.2d 238 (La. App. 1943), where
the court considered that the Carlino decision should be controlling in a case
involving the question of whether wages paid the retained employee interrupted
prescription. This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court at 207 La. 8, 20 So.2d
407 (1944) on the grounds that the suit was for specific injury and in such
circumstances the wages paid after injury should not interrupt prescription. Also
in Thornton v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d 46 (1944),
the court seemed to agree that prescription and prematurity were interrelated so
that if a plaintiff could proceed because its action was not premature, prescription
should not be interrupted.
36. D'Antoni v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 213 La. 67, 34 So.2d
378 (1948) ; Thornton v. E. I. Dupont de Netnours & Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d
46 (1944).
37. See note 10 supra.
38. See note 10 supra.
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made in lieu of compensation. 9 This is a very restricted view
in comparison with the old rule that any wages paid the retained
employee interrupted prescription. 40
B. Commencement of Prescription
Normally prescription begins to run at the time of the ac-
cident.41 However, by amendment to R.S. 23:1209 it will not
begin to run at the time of the accident if, at that time, the
injury does not develop. This becomes important in the retained
employee situation when the employee earns his wages. The
question then arises as to whether the injury has developed
when the employee is able to earn his wages.
The jurisprudence is well settled that the employee is con-
sidered disabled within the meaning of the compensation statute
and therefore entitled to compensation when he cannot do work
of reasonably the same nature as that done before the accident.42
Further, if he does the same work but in pain and suffering he
is still considered disabled. 43 Thus the retained employee is en-
titled to compensation. It would seem that since he is entitled
to compensation, prescription would be running on his claim the
whole time he delayed in bringing it. However, in the case of
Mottet v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.4 the employee was in-
jured and then rehired to do lighter work. Thus he was a re-
tained employee. After a year had elapsed from the accident he
was forced to quit even the light work. In answer to a plea of
prescription by the employer, the Supreme Court held that pre-
scription began to run from the day he quit work, not from the
time of the accident. The court stated that it was mere con-
jecture to say that the employee was disabled at the time of the
accident when he earned wages thereafter. This would seem to
conflict with the jurisprudence that an employee is disabled
and thus entitled to compensation when he works in pain and
39. Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 76 So.2d 87 (La. App. 1954), over-
ruled at 229 La. 651, 86 So.2d 522 (1956), on another point.
40. Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 194 So. 99 (La. App.
1940).
41. This is illustrated by the language of LA. R.S. 23:1209 (1950), which
provides that all claims for compensation "shall be barred forever unless within
one year after the accident" payments have been agreed upon or proceedings have
been begun. (Emphasis added.)42. E.g., Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932)
McQueen v. Union Indemnity Co., 136 So. 761 (La. App. 1931).
43. Hingle v. Maryland Casualty Co., 30 So.2d 281 (La. App. 1947) ; Maleby
v. Gulf Refining Co., 1 La. App. 68 (1924).
44. 220 La. 653, 57 So.2d 218 (1952).
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suffering or when he cannot do work of the same reasonable
nature as that done before the accident. Under the Mottet rule
as interpreted by subsequent cases, although an employee work-
ing in pain and suffering will not, because of this, be precluded
from bringing his action for compensation, nevertheless he will
not be forced into bringing such an action because of the rules
relative to prescription.45 Although seemingly inconsistent, these
rules probably reflect sound policy. As stated by Professor
Malone, "considerations of fairness would induce a court to re-
treat from the prospect of penalizing the employee for his ef-
fort to continue working in pain in hope that his condition will
become better. '46
The Mottet case has been consistently followed by the Su-
preme Court and the courts of appeal.4 T Thus it appears that if
the courts find the wages paid the retained employee are un-
earned, prescription will run from the time of the accident but
will be interrupted by the payments.4  On the other hand, if
wages paid the retained employee are earned, prescription will
not begin to run until the employee quits or is dismissed.49 It
seems that every encouragement for rehabilitation is being of-
fered by the courts in this area.
CONCLUSION
The present status of the law relative to the retained em-
ployee seems to leave much to be desired from the standpoint
of policy. Policy dictates that rehabilitation of the injured em-
ployee be favored. However, the distinction drawn between
earned and unearned wages in the field of credit and prescrip-
tion tends to have an adverse effect on rehabilitation. An em-
45. Bynum v. Maryland Casualty Co., 102 So.2d 547 (La. App. 1958). See
also Wallace v. Remington Rand, Inc., 229 La. 651, 86 So.2d 522 (1956).
. 46. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 79,
§-384 (Supp. 1955).
47. Wallace v. Remington Rand Inc., 229 La. 651, 86 So.2d 522 (1956)
Bynum v. Maryland Casualty Co., 102 So.2d 547 (La. App. 1958); France v.
New Orleans, 92 So.2d 473 (La. App. 1957) ; Watson v. United States Tobacco
Co., 87 So.2d 205 (La. App. 1956).
48. See Thornton v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 207 La. 239, 21 So.2d
46 (1944) ; Chauvin v. St. Mary Iron Works, 55 So.2d 617 (La. App. 1951)
Cradeur v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 52 So.2d 601 (La. App. 1951)
Perkins v. American Employers Insurance Co., 53 So.2d 462 (La. App. 1951)
Ababire v. Cities Service Refining Corp., 50 So.2d 307 (La. App. 1951).
49. See Wallace v. Remington Rand Inc., 229 La. 651, 86 So.2d 522 (1956);
Bynum v. Maryland Casualty Co., 102 So.2d 547 (La. App. 1958); France v.
New Orleans, 92 So.2d 473 (La. App. 1957) ; Watson v. United States Tobacco
Co., 87 So.2d 205 (La. App. 1956).
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ployer is not likely to find lighter work for the employee no
longer able to perform regular work if wages paid therefor are
considered earned and hence not credited against compensation
due the employee. Further, the uncertainty present as to whether
wages are actually earned or unearned may have a detrimental
effect on an employee's claim. If the employee assumes his
wages fall in the unearned classification but in actuality they
do not, prescription will bar his claim. However, if the employee
chooses to sue to establish his claim and avoid the risk of having
it prescribe, he runs the risk of losing his job.
Thus it seems that, from a standpoint of policy, the distinc-
tion between earned and unearned wages in the problem areas
of the retained employee should be abolished. This would defi-
nitely encourage rehabilitation, since the employer could be sure
that he would not have to pay both wages and compensation.
At the same time the employee could be sure that his claim is
not prescribing since all the wages paid would interrupt pre-
scription. As a result he would not be forced into court. It
seems that rehabilitation should be a primary consideration of
the courts; and since the elimination of the distinction between
earned and unearned wages would encourage rehabilitation,
there appears to be good reason for such elimination.
Hillary Crain
Strict Liability For Uses of Property Under the
Louisiana Civil Code
Under the classic doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher' the com-
mon law imposes liability on certain activities without a showing
1. Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), reversed
in L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affirmed in L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). In deciding the
case, the court in the Exchequer Chamber said: "We think that the true rule of
law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which
is the natural consequence of its escape." Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265,
279-80 (1866). In the House of Lords, it was stated that the principle applied
only to a non-natural use of the defendant's land. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3
H.L. 330, 338 (1868). Since the Rylands decision, various terms for the rule
have evolved, e.g., strict liability for abnormal things and activities (PROSSER,
ToUTs § 59 (2d ed. 1.955)), liability for ultrahazardous activities (RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs § 519 (1938)). Dean Prosser states that today a doctrine based on the
Rylands decision obtains in England and some twenty American jurisdictions.
PROSSER, op. cit. 8upra, at 329, 333.
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